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1 AUG - 31 OCT 1969

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS  
1ST CAVALRY DIVISION ARTILLERY (AIRMOBILE)  
APO 96490

AVDAAR-T

3 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 October 1969 RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

HD 507469  
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Section 1 (C) Significant Organization of Unit Activities

1. (U) General

a. This report covers the period 1 August 1969 through 31 October 1969. During this period the Division Artillery supported maneuver forces in 1st CAV DIV (AM) Operation Kentucky Cougar. The operation continues in effect at the end of the reporting period.

(1) Mission. The 1st CAV DIV ARTY and supporting fire units provide fire support to 1st CAV DIV (AM) maneuver forces within the division's assigned TAOI and take necessary action to enhance the GVN pacification effort, and to improve the effectiveness of all RVNAF elements.

(2) Special Mission: the 1st CAV DIV ARTY (AM) continues to act as the maneuver headquarters for AO Chief and control the defenses of the 1st CAV DIV (AM) base camp at Phouc Vinh, RVN.

b. Task Organization (see Inclosure 1).

c. Artillery moves (see Inclosure 2).

d. Commanders and Principle Staff (see Inclosure 3).

2. (C) Intelligence

a. Area of Operations

(1) War Zone "C". Enemy activity in War Zone "C" during July and up until the 12 August high point decreased sharply over the previous reporting period. The enemy was weakened due to successful interdiction of his supply routes and the destruction of his cache areas by Arc Lights and artillery.

During August and early September, the 95C Regiment, 1st NVA Division, with its sapper elements, attempted to inflict casualties on First Team forces occupying FSBs throughout War Zone "C". On 11 August, FSB Beckie recieved a mortar attack followed by a company sized attack.

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from the west and northwest. The enemy lost 17 KIA in this attack. The following night the enemy launched an indirect rocket and mortar attack, followed by a two company ground attack from the west and northwest. Fifty-four (54) enemy were KIA in this attack. On 15 August the enemy had moved east and attacked FSB Jamie, losing 12 KIA. 5 September found the enemy back in the western portion of War Zone "C", again launching an unsuccessful attack on FSB Iko, followed by another attack on 14 September, suffering 34 KIA and 1 PW.

Shortly after the 14 September attack, the enemy withdrew north toward the Cambodian border, leaving War Zone "C" void of many enemy units. The enemy appears to be sitting and waiting, observing progress of the Paris Peace Talks and the anti-war movement in the US. It is felt some enemy resupply activity continues in War Zone "C", indicating a possible high point in early November. Should it materialize, the high point will probably consist of periodic attacks by fire and ground probes.

(2) Binh Long Province. On 29 July, a Hoi Chanh from the 272nd Regiment, 9th VC Division rallied to ARVN elements. The Hoi Chanh revealed plans for an attack against An Loc and Loc Ninh, which were to be mounted by elements of the 9th VC, 7th NVA, and 1st NVA Divisions. The attacks were to occur between 5 and 15 August. This information was substantiated by verifying heavy enemy activity in the "Fish Hook" area by sensors and visual reconnaissance.

In reaction to this intelligence, a series of Arc Lights, followed by light fire team and ground unit insertions, resulted in 72 enemy KIA, 9 PWs, and 3 Hoi Chanh, confirming the 9th VC Divisions presence in Binh Long (P).

On 12 August, the enemy launched the first phase of his fall offensive. In the early morning hours, he struck several major friendly installations. Quan Loi Base Camp was attacked by elements of the 272nd Regiment, 9th VC Division, in conjunction with the 4th Bn, N16 Armor Office COSVN. The enemy suffered 55 KIA in this action. Simultaneously, the 271st Regiment, 9th VC Division launched attacks on FSBs Sidewinder and Aspon. Suffering 110 KIAs and one PW. In other action on 12 August, elements of the 11th ACR engaged enemy elements two kilometers east of FSB Sidewinder, accounting for 85 enemy KIA.

The enemy had taken heavy casualties and was attempting to withdraw into Cambodia. On 13 August, the 11th ACR made contact with elements of the 209th Regiment, 7th NVA Division west of FSB Kelly, accounting for 77 NVA KIA. The enemy sustained a total of 460 KIA during the 12-13 August highpoints.

On 6 September in the northwest portion of Binh Long Province, elements of the 209th Regiment were contacted to the southwest

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of Loc Ninh, resulting in 40 enemy KIA and 4 PWs. PWs and documents captured on 10 September identified the 165th Regiment in the general area of the 6 September contact with the 209th Regiment.

During the remainder of September, enemy activity was insignificant. Captured documents indicated the displacement of the 101D Regiment and the 272nd Regiment to War Zone "C". The remainder of forces in Binh Long Province have withdrawn to the Cambodian border and appear to be in a stand-down posture. First Team operations have eliminated the opportunity for the enemy to launch a second phase of his fall offensive.

(3) Phuoc Long Province. Enemy activity in Phuoc Long Province had been at a low level until mid-July when a Hoi Chanh identified his unit as the 5th Bn, 95th Regiment, 5th VC Division. On 8 August, another soldier identified his unit as the 3rd Bn, 275th Regiment, 5th VC Division. He added that all three regiments of the 5th VC Division (95A, 275th, 174th) were at that time located in Phuoc Long Province.

The First Team quickly reacted, relocating the 2nd and 3rd Brigades into the area, successfully interdicting the Serge's Jungle Highway and the Adams Road Complex with strategically located FSBs and a deliberate ground and air reconnaissance.

On 12 August, elements of the 275th attacked friendly units at Duc Phong and FSB Caldwell, resulting in 21 enemy KIA.

On 3 September, elements of the 3rd MSF made contact with elements of the 5th Bn, 95A Regiment, and 24th AA Bn, 5th VC Division. The enemy suffered 21 KIA in this contact. Hoi Chanh reports indicate that August Arc Lights cut deeply into the resources of the 5th VC Division, destroying the Division hospital and inflicting heavy casualties on the 174th and 275th Regiment.

In early September the 5th VC Division assumed a stand-down posture, and Hoi Chanh reports indicate Arc Lights are taking a heavy toll of the enemy. It is believed the 5th VC Division has withdrawn toward the Cambodian border and is not fully combat effective.

It is expected that the 5th VC Division will begin to refit, resupply, and retrain in late October in an attempt to regain an offensive capability. Another possibility is that the Division will move to Long Khan Province to bolster enemy strength in that area.

(4) AO Chief. During the reporting period, enemy reconnaissance elements were active. On 8 August, Ranger Team 32 contacted 5 individuals 9 kilometers SSE of Camp Gorvad, resulting in 2 NVA KIA. Captured documents indicated a 12 May perimeter probe of Camp Gorvad. On the night of 11 and 12 May, movement was noted on the perimeter of Camp Gorvad, starting approximately 2350 hours. Positive sightings followed and the perimeter wire was cut in several locations by enemy sappers.

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A vigorous series of counter attacks from the perimeter followed, coupled with various fire support assets applied at points on the perimeter and locations just south of Camp Gorvad, resulting in a total of 30 enemy KIA and numerous enemy weapons captured. Effective deployment of platoon sized elements at key points throughout AO Chief, by the base defense battalion, precluded offensive operations by the enemy in the AO.

Despite the sharp increase in enemy activity in the remainder of the First Team AO during August, activity in AO Chief was highlighted only by a standoff attack against Camp Gorvad on 15 August, probably by the K33 Artillery Battalion, using 122mm rockets for the first time.

In late August, 6 PWs captured by the 1st Infantry Division SW of AO Chief, indicated that enemy morale was low and supplies were critical. This can be attributed to allied success in interdicting enemy supply routes in the area.

A PW captured by the Chon Thanh Subsector on 5 September, identified the 7th Bn, N16 Armor Office, and stated an attack on Phuoc Vinh was a future mission of the Battalion. Radar detected a sharp increase in enemy movement in AO Chief during the first week in September, and on 5 September, Camp Gorvad received 4 volleys of mixed 107mm and 122mm rockets.

On 11 September an estimated platoon of sappers attempted to penetrate the SE perimeter near Bunker 44. Four NVA were KIA in the action. On 14 September, rnu Gao District captured an individual in the area of the attempted probe who identified the 5th Bn, N16 Armor Office. He stated 25 men were involved in the attack, confirming the estimate made following the attack.

On 18 September Camp Gorvad received three 82mm rounds and on 23 September 12-107mm rounds.

Despite being greatly hampered by friendly operations, the enemy still maintains the capability to initiate infrequent harassing attacks. He can still be expected to launch small ground probes against Camp Gorvad and continue his standoff rocket and mortar attacks. Intelligence reports indicate a coming high point of enemy activity, oriented strongly on Phuoc Vinh and Camp Gorvad, between 1 and 5 November.

b. Survey. The First Team Division Artillery Survey Section continued to provide fourth-order survey data to firing elements within the Division AO. Survey control was brought to five new fire support bases and numerous FSBs had survey data updated during the reporting period. In addition, the Div Arty Survey Section calibrated nine firing batteries and provided an "on call" crater analysis/shell rep team, which responded quickly to

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incoming attacks. This resulted in the placing of timely and accurate artillery fire on known and suspected enemy launching sites.

### c. Radar

(1) HHB, Div Arty and each of the three DS Artillery Battalions operated an AN/MFQ-4A Counter-Mortar Radar. In addition to its counter-mortar role, the Q-4 proved to be a economical and time-saving means of conducting artillery registrations.

(2) Div Arty's two AN/TPS-25 Ground Surveillance Radars showed themselves to be valuable target acquisition devices. The two radars acquired a total of 372 hostile targets during the reporting period. Their use in conjunction with Nighthawk, IR, SLAR, and sensor devices proved to be not only a means of rapid and accurate target detection, but was a reliable method of verifying intelligence information.

(3) Div Arty was also responsible for the management and control of the Division's 17 AN/TPS-5 Ground Surveillance Radars. Radars were picked up from fire support bases as repairs or evacuation were needed. The sets were sent to 147th Maintenance for repair and new sets immediately returned to the FSBs. Missions were flown on a 24 hour basis, often during hours of darkness, providing the First Team's FSBs continual radar coverage.

### 3. (C) Operations

a. Plans: During the period 1 August 1969 through 31 October 1969, the 1st CAV DIV (Aii) participated in Operation Kentucky Cougar.

b. Operation Kentucky Cougar: 181930 June 69 to present.

(1) Concept of Operations: Direct support artillery was provided on a maneuver battalion - artillery battery basis, with batteries changing OPCON from their parent battalions as the brigade task organization changed. Medium artillery organic to the division was used in a General Support Reinforcing role to weigh critical areas and influence the battle. Aerial Rocket Artillery was given a Modified General Support Reinforcing mission which allowed the reinforced artillery battalion to direct the employment of up to two sections of AAA Cobras under specific conditions. Heavy artillery support was requested from supporting fire units of the 23rd Arty Gp and II FFV. Artillery and automatic weapons were used for convoy and fire support base/base camp security. Artillery support was provided to USSF camps and VIIAF elements.

### (2) Execution:

Organization for Combat:

2nd Bn, 19th Arty: DS 1st Bde, 1ACD

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1st Bn, 77th Arty: DS 2nd Bde, 1ACD

1st Bn, 21st Arty: DS 3rd Bde, 1ACD

1st Bn, 30th Arty: GS 1st Cav Div Arty,

Sep How batteries, 11th ACR: DS 11th ACR under OPCON  
6th Bn, 27th Arty

(3) All three brigades of the 1st ACD and the 11th ACR continued to operate in same areas in which they were reported last period. Internal boundary adjustments were made to allow for maneuver of ARVN forces of battalion and regimental size. The 1st Bde AO is generally north and northeast of Tay Ninh extending to the Cambodian border. 2nd Bde AO extends generally north to Cambodia and south to Dong Xoai from Song Be, which is center of mass. The 3rd Bde AO extends from the Cambodian border south to Chi Linh along the Song Be River and includes Quan Loi. The 11th ACR area of operations extends south from the Cambodian border to vicinity of Chon Than along Highway QL13 and includes Loc Ninh and An Loc. It is bordered on the west by Cambodia down to the tip of the Fish Hook area. DIV ARTY conducts ground operations in AO Chiof which is an area varying in radius of 10 to 20 km centered around Phouc Vinh.

c. Activity throughout the 1st CAV DIV area of operations was moderate to heavy during August and lighter during September and October. In August, the enemy's offensive efforts focused on Binh Long Province and the population centers of Loc Ninh, An Loc, and Quan Loi, each of which is also a major military installation. Coordinated attacks were carried out against other locations but the principle effort was against US/ARVN installations in Binh Long Province. Division Artillery units supported US/ARVN forces as they successfully countered all enemy attacks, handing the enemy a tremendous defeat in the Binh Long Province. Enemy activity during September and October consisted primarily of standoff attacks. 1st Cavalry Division forces conducted extensive ground reconnaissance to find and destroy the enemy, his base camps, and logistical support areas. Division Artillery made extensive use, during the reported period, of all intelligence sources to develop targets for attack.

d. 1st Cavalry Division Artillery units supported the GVN Pacification and Development Plan at every opportunity. Friendly villages were supported with artillery fire and on-call targets were planned and fired around allied settlements to insure their defense when under attack. Artillery assistance programs were conducted by DIV ARTY units which materially improved the RVNAF artillery unit's capability to support their own forces.

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e. Ammunition Expenditures (1 Aug-31 Oct) HE ONLY

UNIT	CALIBER	AMOUNT	TONNAGE
2nd Bn, 19th Arty	105MM	72,042	2,017.2
1st Bn, 77th Arty	105MM	78,667	2,202.6
1st Bn, 21st Arty	105MM	68,337	1,913.4
TOTAL (105):		<u>219,046</u>	
1st Bn, 30th Arty	155MM	35,581	1,956.9
2nd Bn, 20th Arty	2.75 FFAR	77,756	
2nd Bn, 20th Arty	7.62MM	1,238,962	
2nd Bn, 20th Arty	40MM	52,244	

f. Artillery Moves (1 Aug-31 Oct 69)

	AUG 69	SEP 69	OCT 69	RPT PERIOD
2nd Bn, 19th Arty	4	2	12	18*
1st Bn, 77th Arty	8	5	3	16**
1st Bn, 21st Arty	7	8	2	17
<u>1st Bn, 30th Arty</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>13 (23)*</u>
TOTAL:	25	17	22	64

g. 2nd Bn, 20th Arty (ARA) Employment Statistics 1 Aug - 31 Oct 69

Hours Flown	6664
Sections on ARA Fire Missions	862
Sections on ARA GAFs	945
Sections as Gunships	464
Sections on Mortar Patrol	265
Aircraft on Hunter/Killer	325

\*10 moves credited to 2/19 were made by A-2/19 while under OPCON to 1/30 Arty.

\*\*NOTE: 1/77 Bn Hqs/HNB also relocated two times during this period.

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4. (U) Training

a. General. Formal instruction over and above normal recurring training prescribed by 1st CAV DIV Cir 350-1 consists primarily of three programs: a Forward Observer School, Counter-Sapper Training and Demonstrations .. presented to the entire division, and artillery assistance and training to ARVN artillery units .. through the DONG TIEN (Forward Together ) Plan .. in support of the ARVN upgrading mission of the Division. In addition, Div Arty units liaison officers and forward observers conduct informal artillery training for the US and ARVN infantry units that they support, on a continuous basis.

b. Forward Observer School. 1st Cav Div Arty conducts formal forward observer training to newly arrived or assigned personnel who will be members of a forward observer team. The purpose of the instruction is to familiarize officers and enlisted men with the techniques of artillery adjustment in Vietnam. Two days of classroom instruction and one day of actual artillery and Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA) adjustment are conducted. Seven classes were conducted during the period 1 Aug 69 - 31 Oct 69, graduating 56 students.

c. Counter-Sapper Training/Demonstrations. 1st Cav Div Arty is responsible for presenting formal counter-sapper training and sapper demonstrations to all the fire support bases and base camps within the 1st Cav TAOI. This is accomplished on a recurring basis in an attempt to reach as many personnel as possible. Each POI consists of opening remarks (10 mins) giving the background of two former sappers assigned to Div Arty as Kit Carson Scouts, that give the demonstration portion; a 15 minute class on the enemy sapper .. his background, training, and methods/techniques of attack; and a 15 minute demonstration, highlighted by the two former sappers negotiating the perimeter wire and anti-intrusion devices. This POI is also presented to each Combat Leaders Course conducted by the 1st Cav Div's First Team Academy. Following the class, the two Kit Carson Scouts are made available for questioning and to analyze the perimeter defense, as commanders may desire.

d. Artillery Assistance/Training. Division Artillery units continued an aggressive assistance program throughout the reporting period. Artillery battalions instructed supported infantry units in proper adjustment of artillery fires including ARA. The ARVN artillery forward observers and the US advisors of ARVN units received instruction in the employment of ARA from the 2nd Bn (AM), 19th Artillery in the 1st Bde AO. Division Artillery units in the 2nd and 3rd Bde AO's trained ARVN artillery units in airmobile techniques and conducted formal gunnery training for the fire direction centers of several ARVN firing units.

5. (U) Logistics

During the reported period the S-4 section implemented a vigorous supervision program which took representatives to the forward fire bases and base camps to evaluate and monitor, primarily, Class I, IV, and V



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stockage and resupply. Additionally, early in the period, the Division Artillery Food Service Representative began evaluating field messing facilities and operations to insure uniformity throughout the Div Arty units. Near the end of the period a command maintenance visit was initiated into the program which takes the Div Arty Maintenance Officer to the fire bases and base camps throughout the 1st Cav TAOI on a recurring basis.

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## 6. (C) Organization

a. Strength. Authorized and assigned strength as of the end of the reporting period were as follows:

(1) AUTHORIZED:	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
	*HHB	24/2	3	135/15	162/17
	**E/82	20/1	17/1	91/25	128/27
	1/21	43	2	391	436
	1/77	43	2	391	436
	2/19	43	2	391	436
	**2/20	53/3	52/3	313/156	418/162
	1/30	37	6	555	598
(2) ASSIGNED:	*HHB	31/2	17/1	89/25	116/27
	**E/82	20/1	17/1	89/25	116/27
	1/21	39	1	353	393
	1/77	42	1	348	391
	2/19	38	1	354	393
	**2/20	56/3	44/2	303/112	403/117
	1/30	36	5	518	559

NOTE: \*Figures below diagonal are the attached 273rd and 268th Radar Teams (TPS-25).

\*\*Figures below diagonal are the KD Teams attached (Aircraft Maintenance Teams).

## b. Casualties

UNIT	(AUGUST)			(SEPTEMBER)			(OCTOBER)		
	KIA	WIA	MIA	KIA	WIA	MIA	KIA	WIA	MIA
2/19	1	13		1	15		1		2
1/77	3	15		6					
1/21		4		3	14		1	1	
1/30	11	40		2	18				

